US Soldiers in Opium Poppy Field
Everywhere the CIA goes, drugs come back. In March of this year we took a look at the work of Professor Alfred McCoy, author of “The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia”. Portions of a lengthy article by McCoy are reproduced in the article at this link:
http://www.covertbookreport.com/professor-alfred-mccoy-on-the-politics-of-heroin/
(Excerpt)
“Once the mujahedeen fighters brought the opium across the border, they sold it to Pakistani heroin refiners operating in the country’s North-West Frontier Province, a covert-war zone administered by the CIA’s close ally General Fazle Haq. By 1988, there were an estimated 100 to 200 heroin refineries in the province’s Khyber district alone. Further south in the Koh-i-Soltan district of Baluchistan Province, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the CIA’s favored Afghan asset, controlled six refineries that processed much of the opium harvest from the Helmand Valley into heroin. Trucks of the Pakistani army’s National Logistics Cell, arriving in these borderlands from the port of Karachi with crates of weaponry from the CIA, left with cargos of heroin for ports and airports where it would be exported to world markets.
In May 1990, as this covert operation was ending, the Washington Post reported that the CIA’s chief asset Hekmatyar was also the rebels’ leading heroin trafficker. American officials, the Post claimed, had long refused to investigate charges of heroin dealing by Hekmatyar, as well as Pakistan’s ISI, largely “because U.S. narcotics policy in Afghanistan has been subordinated to the war against Soviet influence there.”
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That was the state of heroin trafficking in the 80’s. Now, we have an update on the subject in an article by Pepe Escobar, carried in “Counterpunch”. Excerpts and link below:
http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/09/30/afghanistan-its-the-heroin-stupid/
September 30, 2016
Afghanistan; It’s the Heroin, Stupid
by Pepe Escobar
(Excerpts)
“A Western covert intel operative with knowledge of how Afghanistan was handled at the highest levels in Washington lays down the case:
Osama bin Laden was a failed CIA asset that was used as a pretext to invade Afghanistan to restart the heroin trade, which is a trillion-dollar business. Mullah Omar was our ally against the Soviets, and a most honorable man, who shut down all the heroin plantations in Afghanistan after the Taliban took over as they considered the over 300,000 dead who died from heroin overdoses per year immoral. We turned on him and betrayed him. Osama was a guest of Mullah Omar, and he merely asked for evidence of Osama’s involvement in 9/11. Since there was none, as he was not involved, none could be furnished. Bush II ridiculed on television even the thought that he would be required to give evidence to a bow and arrow Mullah Omar.
It gets much juicier when the operative details what few have had the courage to spell out; the CIA’s real agenda in Afghanistan:
The CIA used the heroin proceeds for external operations and so their revenue had been cut off when the Taliban were in power. This way they could always circumvent the US Congress. Heroin; that is why we are still there. Terrorism is engineered through Operation Gladios as this is being used to justify these interventions. Most Western intel agencies are connected to this trade. 93 % of the world’s heroin comes from Afghanistan. After the US invasion heroin growing was immediately restarted. The military convoys from the Pakistan ports to Afghanistan carried back as backhaul the heroin for world distribution. The Taliban and Osama had absolutely nothing to do with 9-11.”
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Heroin is the most overvalued commodity in the world, worth more than gold, silver or oil. The distribution of Heroin pays for CIA black operations, pushes targeted Russian client states into addiction, and allows for a heavy degree of social control through drug laws.
How can an authoritarian American kleptocracy lose? They control the grow operations, distribution, drugging of target populations, and the subsequent police state that results.
